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The first iteration of “Ethics in Focus,” published two years ago, concerned the aims of ethics 
education at the college level.1 My introduction began with the Socratic question of whether virtue 
can be taught.2 Aristotle’s answer to this question, I noted, appears to be both yes and no: yes, by 
example; no, by formal instruction. But his Nicomachean Ethics must then puzzle us, for Aristotle 
says explicitly that its aim is not theoretical but practical: “we are investigating not in order that 
we might know what virtue is, but in order that we might become good.”3
 
The puzzle here is, if 
virtue does not develop through formal instruction, how are lectures like those collected in the 
Nicomachean Ethics supposed to help us become good? In brief, what good in this regard is the 
sort of education that college ethics courses typically provide? 
The introduction went on to review various positions in the literature. For example, the political 
scientist John Mearsheimer notoriously denies that “elite universities,” at least, have any business 
“providing moral guidance.”4 Similarly, though on different grounds, Stanley Fish calls for a 
“purified academic enterprise” wherein instructors abjure any intention to shape students’ morals 
or politics.5 Gregory Bassham’s contribution to the forum, “Mearsheimer’s Mistakes: Why 
Colleges Should (and Inevitably Do) Provide Moral Guidance,” indicates reasons to wonder about 
the coherence of both these positions.6 A more promising position in the literature is associated 
with Lawrence Kohlberg and his students, including Carol Gilligan. According to this school, 
“morality […] is neither ‘taught’ nor ‘caught’ but is inexorably developed out of each individual’s 
personal struggle to make sense of the world”7—more technically, the personal struggle to come 
to terms with “problematic situations of conflict” in which a previously settled mode of structuring 
our relationships with others is found no longer to fit with, or quite literally to “do justice to,” new 
elements of our experience that we are invested in maintaining.8
 
In light of this conception of 
morality as developing out of our “structuring tendencies,” the aim of moral education, Kohlberg 
claims, “should be to stimulate people’s thinking ability over time in ways which will enable them 
to use more adequate and complex reasoning patterns to solve moral problems”9: reduced to a 
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catchphrase, “stimulation of movement to the next stage of moral reasoning.”10 
As its title suggests, the aim of this third iteration of “Ethics in Focus” is to consider what comes 
“after Kohlberg.” This question is pressing in light of research finding that, in the words of a 
onetime representative of Kohlberg’s school, “there is only a weak link between moral reasoning 
and moral action.”11 As a result of this research, “the centrality of deliberative reasoning in moral 
behavior” has been called into doubt.12 Greater appreciation of the so-called intuitive mind, which 
is “comprised of multiple nonconscious, parallel-processing systems that learn implicitly from 
environmental patterns and behave automatically, often without awareness,” has led instead to 
renewed focus on the importance of moral sensitivity, motivation, dispositions, and character—in 
a word, the virtues, for which sophistication in reasoning is necessary but not sufficient.13 
This change in focus has generated a lot of excitement and discussion,14 but two challenges 
need to be recognized. First, part of the attraction of Kohlberg’s theory is that it holds moral 
development can in fact be assessed. After all, “verbally expressed rational skills are […] 
accessible to measurement” through well-validated instruments like the Defining Issues Test 
(DIT).15 Moral sensitivity, motivation, dispositions, and character, by contrast, appear much more 
elusive.16 Granted, assessment instruments like the DIT may not scrutinize all that educators seek 
to accomplish in an ethics curriculum—for example, formation in a particular moral tradition with 
a distinctive account of the virtues seeks more than development from one stage of reasoning to 
the next—but the DIT and the like do measure phenomena that otherwise might seem to resist 
objective measurement.17 Anyone who does not appreciate this advantage has not recently had to 
satisfy an accrediting agency! 
The second challenge is to the very possibility of character formation. So-called situationists 
point to experiments in social psychology suggesting that situational factors, not character traits, 
function as the primary determinants of people’s actions. For example, it has been found that “the 
greater the number of bystanders present at an emergency, the lower [the] probability that any one 
of them will offer assistance.”18 At best, according to the situationists, character traits appear all 
too vulnerable to “moral ambush.”19 At worst, either they just don’t exist at all—a claim based on 
the observation that they don’t appear to make any difference in situations where they would be 
expected to give evidence of themselves—or they exist only in quite specific circumstances, so-
called local situations. Perhaps, for example, they exist within the context of particular professions 
like the military or medicine, where there are limits to the types of situations people tend to 
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experience qua soldier or qua physician.20 
The situationist challenge to ethics education is profound. If situational factors matter more than 
both character and reasoning capacities, why teach ethics other than to introduce students to the 
history of ideas? Or, why teach more than professional ethics, where instruction might make some 
practical difference?21 
Both the situationist challenge and that of measuring moral formation have occupied the 
collaborators of the Catholic Social Teaching (CST) Learning and Research Initiative, organized 
in 2012.22 Hence this forum’s subtitle. This initiative means to be an answer to a problem. As 
Roger Bergman, one of the initiative’s collaborators, has noted, in the standard CST canon of 
magisterial pronouncements, “there is almost no mention of how this teaching is to be taught. Or 
rather, a default pedagogy is implicit: promulgate the documents, teach the principles, exhort the 
faithful to put these principles into practice.”23 But this pedagogy is little better than none. As 
Bergman asks, “how do we stimulate the hunger and thirst?”24 More fully, how to present CST to 
students critically, without preaching, and in such a way that they could desire to be formed by 
it?25 Further—and here the situationist challenge rears its head—how to present CST in such a 
way that it could make a difference for students’ lives beyond the limited circumstances of the 
college experience, with its many pre-fabricated opportunities for putting theory into practice? 
And then, how to measure that students’ formation in CST has made a difference? In other words, 
how are educators to know that the learning of CST has taken place? “You will know them by 
their fruits,” Jesus says in the Sermon on the Mount in a pericope that could make an accrediting 
agency’s heart skip (Mt 7:16). What, though, are the fruits for which CST is the seed? 
The contributors to this forum represent several disciplines. Jennifer Reed-Bouley is Professor 
of Theology and Director of the Theology Program at the College of Saint Mary in Omaha, 
Nebraska. Jerome Zurek is Professor of Communication and Chair of the Communication 
Department at Cabrini College in Radnor, Pennsylvania. Margarita Rose is Professor of 
Economics and Chair of the Economics Department at King’s College in Wilkes-Barre, 
Pennsylvania. Finally, Heather Mack is Director of Heather Mack Consulting LLC in New 
Orleans, Louisiana. She was formerly Community Engagement Research and Assessment Director 
at Loyola University New Orleans. Reed-Bouley, Rose, and Mack are, further, all collaborators in 
the CST Learning and Research Initiative. 
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Notes 
 
1. Note that I do not distinguish here between “ethics” and “morality,” as some philosophers 
do. For purposes of this discussion, ethics is the Greek for which morality is the Latin. 
2. Prusak 2013, 16. 
3. Aristotle 2002, 23 (1103b). 
4. Mearsheimer 1998, 194. 
5. Fish 2008, 153. 
6. Bassham 2013. 
7. Bereiter 1978, 20. 
8. See Kohlberg and Boyd 1973, 371. 
9. Kohlberg and Hersch 1977, 56. 
10. Kohlberg 1975, 673. 
11. Narvaez 2008, 311. 
12. Ibid. 
13. Ibid. See also, for criticism of Kohlberg’s theory in precisely this regard, Spohn 2000, 131–
133. 
14. One example is the 2014 interdisciplinary conference “Virtue and Its Development” hosted 
by Darcia Narvaez at the University of Notre Dame: see http://www3.nd.edu/~dnarvaez/ 
Virtue_Development_Symposium.htm. 
15. See http://ethicaldevelopment.ua.edu/dit-and-dit–2/. 
16. Spohn 2000, 131. 
17. Compare Wieseltier 2015, 1, alleging that “[t]he discussion of culture is being steadily 
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absorbed into the discussion of business. There are now ‘metrics’ for phenomena that 
cannot be metrically measured. Numerical values are assigned to things that cannot be 
captured by numbers. Economic concepts go rampaging through non-economic realms 
[…]. Where wisdom once was, quantification now will be.” 
18. Mayer 2012, 60. In addition to the “bystander effect,” Mayer refers to the “urban overload 
hypothesis,” “pluralistic ignorance,” and deference to authority. 
19. Ibid., 61. 
20. Ibid., 64. 
21. Readers will not be surprised that the situationist challenge has hardly gone unanswered. 
One answer is simply that students should be made aware of the factors that prevent people 
from recognizing the moral stakes of a given situation. Research suggests that people can 
be prepared to overcome “moral ambushes” precisely though learning about the obstacles 
to moral sensitivity. See Mayer, 61–62. Ronald Duska’s contribution to this forum two 
years ago, “What’s the Purpose of Ethics Education?”, insightfully compares the work of 
ethics education to that of art appreciation: what is needed in both cases is to learn to “see 
as,” to overcome “aspect blindness,” to develop an eye not only for the dimensions of what 
is before us, but for what it is about ourselves that occludes our vision. See Duska 2013, 
46–48. In the course of criticizing the top-down approach to teaching ethics, beginning 
with theories and moving to idealized cases, Karen Adkins and Abigail Gosselin’s 
contribution, “Learning from the Labs: Reimagining Ethics Instruction,” emphasizes the 
importance of complicating moral reasoning. Adkins and Gosselin urge in particular 
drawing attention to “relations of domination and oppression” that code “the moral 
reasoning and perspectives of those in positions of privilege as neutral and normal 
standards against which other forms of reasoning and other perspectives are judged.” See 
Adkins and Gosselin 2013, 26. From this perspective, “situationism” names not an 
insuperable challenge to ethics education, but one of its principal concerns. 
22. See http://blogs.nd.edu/cstresearch/. 
23. Bergman 2011, 14. 
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24. Ibid., 9. 
25. Compare Issing 2013, 53, proposing that “teaching Christian ethics is ultimately all about” 
transporting “the student beyond a narrow view of self and world to become amazed by 
the mystery of human existence.” Issing beautifully discusses in this regard the film Of 
Gods and Men (2010), which he describes as having “the potential to carry the viewer 
inside the discernment of the monks” and thereby to appreciate “the coming of Christian 
faith” even if the student does not share it (55–60). 
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